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Abstract
Once a marginal affair, applied phenomenology is now a vast and vibrant move-
ment. With great success, however, comes great criticism, and critics have been 
harsh, accusing applied phenomenology’s practitioners of everything from spewing 
nonsense to assailing down-to-earth researchers with gratuitous jargon. In this arti-
cle, I reconstruct the most damning criticisms as a dilemma: Either applied phenom-
enology merely describes experience, in which case it offers nothing distinctive, or 
it involves the kind of analysis characteristic of classical phenomenology, in which 
case it’s only of interest to a small number of philosophers; either way, we should 
explore the experiential dimension by other means. Notwithstanding the enormous 
body of research in applied phenomenology, few authors have tried to explain what 
makes it an independent intellectual enterprise distinct from pure phenomenology, 
and none has defused this dilemma. Here I try my hand at both. After considering 
eight major approaches to applied phenomenology that fail to defuse the dilemma, 
I propose an approach that, I argue, does the job, one that understands applied phe-
nomenology as a research program that brings the phenomenological method and 
the resources of at least one other discipline to bear on problems beyond the scope 
of any monodisciplinary approach.
Keywords Phenomenology · Applied phenomenology · Phenomenological method · 
Interdisciplinarity · Qualitative research
1 Introduction
While enjoying a recent rise in popularity, applied phenomenology (henceforth 
AP) has also suffered a spate of searing attacks. Critics like Jonathan Sholl accuse 
phenomenologists of launching borderline-ignorant broadsides against naturalism, 
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while failing to furnish any results not already offered by psychology and its sub-
fields.1 Others go further still and claim that AP has risen to prominence on hot air, 
i.e., jargon-laced gas that obscures the emptiness of its claims and the arbitrariness 
of its methods.2 Criticisms are no less rancorous within the ranks of AP’s practition-
ers, where major figures like Max van Manen and Jonathan Smith question the phe-
nomenological credentials of each other’s work.3
What should we make of this? Does AP really offer nothing distinctive? Are its 
claims vacuous and its methods haphazard? Should we abandon the practice and 
explore the experiential dimension by other means? That would be hasty, as the 
above criticisms only have bite against certain versions of AP.
In saying this, however, I by no means intend to accuse critics of knowingly 
attacking a straw man. To the contrary, the major misunderstandings at issue here 
stem, in large part, not from AP’s critics but rather from three other sources that 
feed into their work. First, the story of phenomenology, as Ricoeur famously puts it, 
reads like a “history of Husserlian heresies”, with each major figure taking up Hus-
serl’s method only to redefine it in some supposedly fundamental way.4 According 
to some, this has left phenomenology a fractured discourse with no shared aims or 
methods. Secondly, to dodge longstanding concerns about phenomenology’s tran-
scendental aspirations, some phenomenologists confine themselves to nothing more 
than the ‘careful first-person description of experience’, which indeed makes their 
approach seem indistinguishable from other descriptive research methods. Finally, 
analytic philosophy of mind has inadvertently muddied the waters further by using 
the term phenomenology as a synonym for phenomenality, an equivalence that phe-
nomenologists rejected early on, as it often reduces phenomenology to the unphilo-
sophical activity of introspecting one’s private mental states.5 These three trends all 
court confusion about what phenomenology is.
The ambiguity multiplies in AP. Not only does confusion from the above sources 
seep into the applied discourse but, to make matters worse, in many cases authors 
simply cherry-pick terms from their favourite phenomenologists, without apparent 
concern for what makes those ideas phenomenological, as if one does AP simply by 
co-opting terminology. What’s more, very little work has been done to explain what 
makes AP a distinctive intellectual enterprise. What distinguishes AP from pure 
phenomenology? Few researchers have even tried to answer this question.
If we fail to pin down what we do when we do phenomenology, and we barely 
bother to distinguish AP from its pure counterpart, why should critics be anything 
but confused about what the tradition offers? As I see it, then, we owe AP’s crit-
ics thanks for challenging the phenomenological community to specify what AP is 
and what makes it distinctive. This kind of clarificatory work matters. No physicist 
would tolerate me calling my careful descriptions of physical objects colliding in the 
1 Sholl (2015).
2 Gergel (2012) and Paley (2017).
3 van Manen (2017a, 2017b) and Smith (2018).
4 Ricoeur (1987, p. 9).
5 For a helpful discussion of this, see the first chapter of Zahavi (2017).
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back garden “applied physics”; and none should. Authors working in AP owe their 
readers a substantive justification for using the term phenomenology and an expla-
nation of what makes their practice distinctive. I try to meet those obligations here.
I proceed as follows. First, I reconstruct the most damning criticisms of AP as 
a dilemma. Next, I show why most of today’s approaches to AP fail to escape this 
dilemma unscathed. Finally, to defuse the dilemma, I offer an account of AP as a 
research program that brings the phenomenological method and the resources of at 
least one other discipline to bear on problems beyond the scope of any monodisci-
plinary approach. To be clear, what I offer here is not a new way of doing AP but 
rather a new way of understanding what the best work in AP already does.
2  A dilemma for AP
We can construct our dilemma as follows:
1. If AP offers nothing but first-person descriptions of experience, then it offers noth-
ing distinctive, and we should study the experiential dimension by other means.
2. If AP involves the kind of analysis characteristic of classical phenomenology, then 
its analyses are only of interest to a small group of philosophers, and we should 
study the experiential dimension by other means.
3. Either AP offers nothing but first-person descriptions of experience, or it involves 
the kind of analysis characteristic of classical phenomenology.
4. Therefore, we should study the experiential dimension by other means.6
The first horn of this dilemma captures the most common criticism of AP. Hos-
tile outsiders like Sholl and Paley, sympathetic collaborators like Gergel, and criti-
cal insiders like Zahavi all raise this objection against a significant subset of AP’s 
practitioners.7 Sholl offers a typical formulation: “it is not clear exactly how phe-
nomenology’s first-person emphasis is distinct from what one finds in psychology 
and its various subfields”, and if that’s so, then “the utility of their contributions 
become[s] unclear”.8 Why? Because phenomenological texts teem with confus-
ing phraseology that psychology and its subfields do not inflict on us; what’s more, 
phenomenology affords none of the sophisticated tools and techniques we find in 
contemporary empirical approaches for organising, codifying, synthesizing, and 
interpreting large amounts of first-person data. If phenomenology offers nothing dis-
tinctive, why should we prefer its purple prose to the promising tools and techniques 
of more straightforward empirical approaches? Call this the ‘distinctiveness’ horn of 
the dilemma.
6 To my knowledge, no one formulates their objections to AP in terms of this dilemma; but I think it’s a 
useful way to present a cluster of well-known objections.
7 Sholl (2015), Paley (2017), Gergel (2012), and Zahavi (2019b, 2020, 2021).
8 Sholl (2015, p. 408; p. 400).
278 M. Burch 
1 3
The second horn of the dilemma is as old as phenomenology itself. Classically 
conceived, phenomenology has a transcendental dimension, as it concerns itself not 
so much with particular phenomena, but rather with the conditions of our making 
sense of phenomena. That’s a distinctive offer: Neither psychology nor any of its 
subfields claims to do that. What’s more, none of them would ever want to: After all, 
who cares about such abstruse, esoteric preoccupations outside a philosophy semi-
nar? “No one,” say many of phenomenology’s critics. Call this the ‘Who cares?’ 
horn of the dilemma.
It’s important to bear in mind that these horns work in tandem. If AP’s practition-
ers evade the ‘distinctiveness’ horn by insisting on phenomenology’s transcenden-
tal dimension, then they immediately face the ‘Who cares?’ horn. And if they steer 
clear of the latter by limiting themselves to merely describing experience from the 
first-person perspective, then they get impaled on the ‘distinctiveness’ horn.
3  Dodges and impalements
Before I assess how today’s leading approaches to AP fare against this dilemma, 
I need to clarify something about my procedure. Notwithstanding an enormous 
body of research in AP, few authors try to explain what makes it an independent 
intellectual enterprise distinct from pure phenomenology. In this section, then, I 
make explicit several alternative approaches to AP that operate implicitly in some 
of today’s leading applied phenomenological research. In total, I consider eight 
approaches. I collect the first six in two clusters, according to their shared vulner-
abilities; the last two I evaluate independently.
The first cluster contains three contenders with a common vulnerability to the 
‘distinctiveness’ horn. One contender resides at the intersection of the philosophy of 
mind and the cognitive sciences, in work that seeks to “naturalize phenomenology.” 
Specifically, I have in mind work that takes phenomenological claims on board only 
insofar as those claims track with orthodox naturalism’s two major commitments, 
namely, 1) the ontological commitment that only those entities posited by our best 
scientific theories are real, and 2) the methodological commitment that scientific 
investigation provides the only reliable means to acquire knowledge. This approach 
stands out among our contenders in that it sees AP as the only phenomenology worth 
doing. According to purveyors of this approach, the phenomenological method is 
nothing more than a “technique of introspection” that reveals “how things seem to 
us.”9 Thus, pure phenomenology is epistemically worthless, telling us nothing about 
the way things (scientifically or metaphysically) are. A certain kind of AP, however, 
is worth doing, namely, the work of feeding ‘phenomenological data’ into a broader 
scientific framework in order to build “a bridge—the bridge—between the subjec-
tivity of human consciousness and the natural sciences.”10 On this view, then, AP 
is the incorporation of ‘phenomenological data’ into a scientific image of the mind.
9 Dennett (1991, p. 44) and Noë (2007, p. 231).
10 Dennett (2007, p. 249).
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Our second contender comes from Max van Manen. While van Manen’s research 
differs radically from our first contender, he works with a strikingly similar concep-
tion of phenomenology. Phenomenology, he tells us, pursues “insight into the phe-
nomenality of lived experience,” seeking to “let a phenomenon (lived experience) 
show itself in the way that it gives itself while living through it.”11 What makes van 
Manen’s work applied? His recent response to Zahavi provides an answer: Some 
philosophers, he tells us, “write almost exclusively for other philosophers.” while 
others write in an “accessible manner on topics and issues that are more likely to 
touch many of us”.12 Placing himself in the latter camp, van Manen suggests two 
senses in which we can consider his work applied: (1) he writes for an audience of 
non-philosophers and (2) deals with topics relevant to everyday life.13
The third and final member of this cluster is Interpretative Phenomenologi-
cal Analysis (or IPA). IPA is an idiographic approach to qualitative research that 
attempts to provide granular n = 1 descriptions of “experiences as experienced 
for particular people,” i.e., it aims to describe “experiences as they are lived by an 
embodied socio-historical situated person.”14 Like the first two approaches, then, 
IPA conceives of phenomenology as the careful description of experience. In what 
sense is it applied? Like van Manen, IPA’s authors (a) write for non-philosophers 
and (b) deal with topics relevant to everyday life. But we could also call their work 
applied in the sense that they (c) deal with comparatively specific questions within a 
given discipline because, unlike pure phenomenology, they do not study “the struc-
ture of the phenomenon itself” but rather the single “person’s experience of the phe-
nomenon and the sense they make of their experience.”15
How do the members of this first cluster fare against the dilemma? They all take a 
hit on the ‘distinctiveness’ horn: Every member of this cluster portrays phenomenol-
ogy as nothing more than the careful description of experience, and there’s noth-
ing distinctive about that. Countless research paradigms carefully describe experi-
ence, and many of them also afford tools and techniques for sorting and synthesizing 
experiential data that phenomenology doesn’t offer. The members of this cluster 
thus get impaled on the ‘distinctiveness’ horn.
What about the second horn? Although these authors boast impressive citation 
metrics, the relevant question vis-à-vis the ‘Who cares?’ horn isn’t whether research-
ers in fact care about this work but rather whether they should. The answer to that 
latter question is straightforward: Since what these authors present as phenomenol-
ogy offers nothing distinctive, to the extent that the value of their work hangs on its 
11 van Manen (2017a, p. 779, 2017b, p. 813).
12 van Manen (2019, p. 2).
13 It’s worth noting that these models for AP parallel attempts to conceptualize applied philosophy. So, 
for example, van Manen’s approach to AP resembles both the “audience conception” and the “relevance 
conception” of applied philosophy. See Lippert‐Rasmussen (2016) for a helpful taxonomy of approaches 
to applied philosophy.
14 Smith et al. (2009, p. 16) and Eatough and Smith (2017, p. 194).




putatively phenomenological character, it warrants no special attention.16 In other 
words, to the extent that their work does nothing but describe the ‘what-it’s-like’ 
dimension of experience, there’s no good reason to prefer it to any other descriptive 
approach.
Turning now to the second cluster, its first member comes from the phenome-
nology of medicine (henceforth PM). The major research currents in PM coalesce 
around the claim that phenomenology provides an essential supplement to the bio-
medical approach: specifically, biomedical science studies health, disease, and ill-
ness strictly from the third-person perspective, which phenomenology supplements 
with first-person analyses of the experience of health and illness. Exactly which con-
ception of phenomenology PM promotes is ambiguous. At times, its authors seem 
to follow the first cluster in reducing phenomenology to the careful description of 
experience. Other times, however, they declare phenomenology a “distinctly philo-
sophical method…[that] investigates the conditions of possibility for having a par-
ticular experience.”17 PM’s status as an applied discipline is likewise ambiguous. 
Some of PM’s authors seem to regard their work as pure phenomenology, in which 
case PM would drop from our list of viable approaches to AP. But its authors could 
also lay claim to another common conception of applied work, namely, using an 
established method to tackle topics not previously treated by a tradition.18
The second member of this cluster comes from Wayne Martin and Ryan Hick-
erson. Noting the bitter, longstanding disagreement over phenomenology’s proper 
method, Martin and Hickerson set that dispute aside, defining phenomenology “not 
by its method but by its theoretical aims and by the range of objects with which it is 
concerned.”19 Ecumenical on the matter of method, then, they define phenomenol-
ogy by its focus on “lived experience.”20 Martin and Hickerson then go on to make 
one of few attempts to explicitly distinguish AP from its pure counterpart, declaring 
their work applied on the basis of “its intended practical import.”21 For Martin and 
Hickerson, then, AP is research with an intended practical import that focuses on 
lived experience.
The final member of the second cluster, developed by Dan Zahavi, represents 
another one of the few efforts to distinguish AP from pure phenomenology.22 Criti-
cising authors who insist that AP deploy Husserl’s “epoché” and the “phenom-
enological reduction,” Zahavi exhorts researchers interested in phenomenology to 
ignore these methodological notions: “those who seek to practice applied phenom-
enology, i.e., those who seek to use phenomenological ideas in a non-philosophical 
context,” he argues, need not “employ the epoché and the reduction if their work is 
22 Zahavi (2019a, 2019b, 2020, 2021).
16 This doesn’t apply to Dennett, then, since he has made multiple important, original intellectual contri-
butions that in no way hang on his misuse of the term phenomenology.
17 Carel (2016, pp. 20–21).
18 This resembles the “methodology conception” of applied philosophy (Lippert-Rasmussen 2016).
19 Martin and Hickerson (2013, p. 196).
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid, p. 197.
281
1 3
Make applied phenomenology what it needs to be: an…
to qualify as phenomenological.”23 To do AP, rather, researchers need only employ 
“central phenomenological concepts.”24 Phenomenology, Zahavi argues, is not just 
a method; it’s also a collection of theoretical accounts that researchers can draw on 
to challenge the assumptions of their own respective fields.25 Thus, like Martin and 
Hickerson, Zahavi sets the matter of method aside, and claims that to practice AP, 
one need only apply central phenomenological ideas in a non-philosophical context.
How do these approaches fair against the dilemma? It depends. As we’ve just 
seen, all three leave the question of phenomenology’s proper method fundamen-
tally open-ended: PM vacillates between portraying phenomenology as the mere 
description of experience and as constitutive analysis; Martin and Hickerson’s 
methodological ecumenicism likewise leaves room for work that merely describes 
experience and work that adheres to phenomenology’s traditional methodological 
commitments; finally, Zahavi tells us that AP applies phenomenological ideas in a 
non-philosophical context, and so we can fairly assume that he’s just as ecumeni-
cal about AP’s method as Martin and Hickerson are.26 How these approaches fare 
against the dilemma, then, will depend on which resources practitioners happen to 
draw on. If, like the first cluster, they draw on texts that understand phenomenology 
as nothing but the careful description of experience, then they will take a hit from 
the ‘distinctiveness’ horn. On the other hand, if they draw on more traditional, prop-
erly phenomenological resources, they will survive the ‘distinctiveness’ horn only to 
face pressure from the ‘Who cares?’ horn.
What this means, then, is that we cannot definitively assess how these views fare 
against the dilemma, because none of them definitively distinguishes AP from pure 
phenomenology, i.e., none of them properly explains what warrants AP’s status as 
an independent intellectual enterprise.
Say PM conceives of its work as applied in the sense that it uses the phenomeno-
logical method to tackle topics not previously treated by the tradition. On that con-
ception, the only line between phenomenology and AP is something like an arbitrary 
cut-off date: “The tradition hasn’t talked about X yet, so all work on X is applied.” 
That’s a shaky foundation for establishing AP as an independent intellectual enter-
prise. Say nothing were written on the phenomenology of grief before the cut-off. 
Would any phenomenological work on grief thereafter count as AP, even if in all 
relevant respects it resembles other phenomenological work on the emotions done 
before the cut-off? As I see it, then, the approach fails to offer a real distinction 
between phenomenology and AP.
Martin and Hickerson face a similar problem when they attribute AP its applied 
status on the basis of its “intended practical import.” This implies that whether a 
given phenomenological analysis counts as applied hangs on how one intends to use 
23 Zahavi (2021, p. 3; my emphasis).
24 Zahavi (2019b, p. 905).
25 Zahavi (2021, p. 13).
26 Zahavi doesn’t really adhere to ecumenicism in practice; for instance, he criticizes the work of van 




it. But this fails to distinguish phenomenology from AP at all, since the same analy-
sis can count as pure phenomenology when I intend it as a piece of theory, and as 
AP when I intend to put it to practical use.
Similarly, Zahavi conceptualizes AP as applied because it applies ideas from 
canonical phenomenological texts in a non-philosophical context, and this also fails 
to distinguish AP from pure phenomenology. Why is it applied phenomenology 
when I talk about ‘the other’ in the context of psychiatry or nursing, but good old-
fashioned, pure phenomenology when I talk about ‘the other as such’, even if I draw 
on examples from psychiatry and nursing to illustrate my points? Because the lat-
ter happens in a philosophical context and the former doesn’t?27 Changing context 
doesn’t change what I’m doing sufficiently to warrant treating AP as an independent 
intellectual enterprise; there must be something distinctive about AP that warrants 
its independent status.
It’s also worth highlighting a tension that arises from the methodological ecu-
menicism endorsed by Martin, Hickerson, and Zahavi. In various places, these 
authors rightly insist on the core phenomenological value of carefully attending to 
the phenomena and not prejudicing one’s approach with pre-conceived theoretical 
baggage. But phenomenology’s commitment to bracketing theories and attending to 
‘the things themselves’ sits rather uneasily with their suggestion that we treat the 
phenomenological tradition itself as a collection of theories. It seems to say: bracket 
all your theories, except for phenomenological theories. But these authors cannot 
privilege phenomenological ideas this way, because they set aside the very thing 
that’s meant to guarantee the non-prejudicial character of those ideas, namely, the 
phenomenological method.
Ultimately, I think the members of this cluster avoid questions of method as part 
of a broader strategy to manage the ‘Who cares?’ horn. As Zahavi expresses it, AP 
should not “hyper-philosophize” and force its audience to “choke on methodological 
metareflections,” because this tends to alienate, intimidate, and confuse readers, and 
it does nothing to help researchers achieve their goals.28 Instead, AP should offer its 
audience access to the best phenomenological ideas without burdening them with 
abstruse philosophical reflections that they are poorly positioned to understand. This 
strikes me as a sensible strategy, but we should acknowledge its trade-offs, specifi-
cally, it leaves the border between phenomenology and AP poorly defined, and it 
fails to explain why researchers should feel entitled to draw freely on phenomeno-
logical theories while we insist they bracket other theories.
With these six views behind us, I want to turn now to what I consider the two 
most promising approaches to AP. The first comes from Anthony Fernandez, 
who frames the difference between pure and applied phenomenology as follows: 
27 What’s more, the notion of a non-philosophical context strikes me as problematic. First of all, it’s 
almost impossible to get philosophers to agree on what philosophy is, so how can we determine what 
counts as a philosophical context? Secondly, assuming we know what philosophy is, it seems to me 
that if you’re thinking philosophically, then you’re in a philosophical context. Comparable intellectual 
work should not be deemed non-philosophical just because it’s not done by professional philosophers, or 
because it’s not published in a philosophy journal.
28 Zahavi and Martiny (2019, p. 161) and Zahavi (2021, p. 10),
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Phenomenology clarifies the constitutive features of human existence, which Fer-
nandez, following Heidegger, calls ‘existentials’; and AP studies the diverse mani-
festations (or ‘modes’) that these existentials instantiate across different popula-
tions.29 So, for example, mood is an existential—or a constitutive feature of human 
existence—studied by pure phenomenology; and particular moods, such as anxiety 
and joy, are modes of that existential studied by AP.
This elegant approach constitutes a significant advance in the AP literature. First, 
Fernandez unambiguously banishes the trivial, purely descriptive view of phenom-
enology from AP, framing his approach in terms of phenomenology’s distinctive 
offer, as a discipline that studies the constitutive features of human existence. Thus, 
he neutralizes the ‘distinctiveness’ horn. Secondly, by conceptualising AP as the 
study of the modes that these constitutive features take across different populations, 
he avoids narrowing AP’s purview to a domain that only interests a few philoso-
phers. For instance, in a recent piece, Fernandez perspicuously demonstrates how 
his version of AP provides useful resources for a dimensional approach to psychi-
atric diagnosis.30 Finally, Fernandez is one of the few authors to recognize that we 
must make a sharp distinction between phenomenology and AP to warrant the lat-
ter’s status as an independent intellectual enterprise.
I disagree, however, with the way Fernandez frames that distinction. For one 
thing, his proposal represents a revisionist take on the phenomenological tradition: 
If he’s right, then classic analyses of phenomena such as anxiety, shame, mauvaise 
foi, and authenticity are not pure phenomenological analyses but rather products of 
AP. But this claim, I think, is not only revisionist; it also strikes me as incorrect. 
Consider Heidegger’s account of ‘authenticity.’ As Fernandez rightly notes, authen-
ticity is a mode of human existence. In the phenomenological analyses of the ‘call of 
conscience’ in Division II of Being and Time, Heidegger argues that the capacity to 
take responsibility for our existence (or to evade such responsibility) is a constitutive 
feature of human agency (or an ‘existential’). Moreover, when I transparently act in 
light of that responsibility, I exhibit authenticity as a ‘mode’ of that existential; and 
when I evade that responsibility, I exhibit inauthenticity as a mode of that existen-
tial.31 Importantly, for our present purposes, Heidegger’s accounts of authenticity 
and inauthenticity appeal to no evidence beyond what he relies upon in his phenom-
enological analysis of the existentials that make those modes possible, i.e., they all 
draw on first-person evidence that’s in principle available to anyone. Although it’s 
a mode, then, authenticity strikes me as a perfectly appropriate target for pure phe-
nomenology. Correlatively, since it appeals to no extra-phenomenological evidence, 
I see no principled reason to consider the analysis of authenticity a piece of AP. So, 
although Fernandez rightly recognizes the need for a sharp distinction between phe-
nomenology and AP, I think he draws the wrong distinction.
Our final contender points us towards a conception of AP that defuses the target 
dilemma, and thereby indicates the right way to distinguish phenomenology from 
30 Fernandez (2019).
31 For this interpretation of authenticity, see chapter 9 of Crowell (2013).
29 Fernandez (2017, 2018). Fernandez elaborates the view with his co-author Allan Køster (2019).
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AP. That conception emerges from the division of intellectual labour that Michael 
Wheeler devises for his ‘Heideggerian cognitive science’.32 Specifically, Wheeler 
proposes that Heideggerian cognitive science should use the resources of phenom-
enology to provide a constitutive understanding of our being-in-the-world, while it 
draws on the cognitive sciences to furnish an enabling understanding of the causal 
mechanisms that give rise to our being-in-the-world. This approach, as I see it, 
points us towards what AP needs to be to function as an independent intellectual 
enterprise that defuses the target dilemma. By insisting on the distinctive, consti-
tutive understanding afforded by phenomenology, it evades the ‘distinctiveness’ 
horn; and by providing solutions to problems that cannot be managed within the 
boundaries of a single discipline, it also neutralizes the ‘Who cares?’ horn. More-
over, Wheeler’s approach demonstrates why work in AP warrants its status as an 
independent intellectual enterprise, namely, it answers questions that pure phe-
nomenology could never answer on its own. Unlike the analysis of authenticity just 
discussed, questions regarding the causal enablers that give rise to our being-in-
the-world cannot be answered by relying on the same evidence we use to develop 
a phenomenological account of our being-in-the-world. This, I contend, indicates 
the right way to distinguish between pure and applied phenomenology: The latter 
counts as an independent intellectual enterprise because it relies on evidence and/or 
methods unavailable to – and it solves problems that lie beyond the purview of—its 
pure counterpart. Although he never explicitly pitches it this way, Wheeler’s work 
embodies an approach to AP that could defuse our target dilemma.
4  Defusing the dilemma
The account I develop in Sects. 4.1 and 4.2 can be seen as an attempt to formalize 
Wheeler’s approach into a model of AP that practitioners can use not only in the 
cognitive sciences but across a wide range of disciplines. That model characterizes 
AP as a unique research program that (1) identifies interdisciplinary problems, (2) 
uses phenomenology to characterize the constitutive features of subjectivity impli-
cated by those problems, and (3) integrates (2) with the findings and/or methods of 
some other discipline(s) to solve those problems.
Before I explicate the elements of this model, I want to emphasize that although 
none of the approaches considered in the previous section explicitly conceptualize 
AP in a manner that defuses the target dilemma, the last five contenders have all 
produced work in AP that escapes both horns unscathed.33 To reiterate, then, what 
I offer in this section is not a new way of doing AP but a new way of understanding 
what the best work in AP already does.
32 Wheeler (2005).
33 Zahavi, in particular, has done an incredible amount to advance AP, e.g., he and his co-author Shaun 
Gallagher wrote The Phenomenological Mind (2008), one of the most impactful works in AP, and the 
two of them also co-founded Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, a journal that publishes much 
of the best work in AP.
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4.1  Something distinctive?
In the introduction, we noted that some scholars portray phenomenology as a frac-
tured discourse with no shared research program. Without impugning that view’s 
scholarly credentials, here I take sides with those who argue that all authentic phe-
nomenological practice is united by a shared normative core. Call this core phenom-
enology (henceforth CP).34 CP is the study of meaning and its conditions of pos-
sibility by means of a reflective method that relies strictly on first-person evidence. 
CP’s method is what makes AP a distinctive enterprise.
To understand CP, it helps to consider its founding motives. As Steven Crow-
ell and Amie Thomasson discuss in detail, CP shares an origin story with analytic 
philosophy: both emerged in response to early  20th-century anxiety about the fate 
of philosophy after the breath-taking success of the natural sciences.35 What role 
remains for philosophy when the sciences become autonomous? Both traditions hit 
on the same basic answer: Whereas the sciences study natural objects and the regu-
larities that govern them, philosophy studies meaning. Meaning, after all, is in no 
obvious sense a natural object amenable to scientific study; and yet it remains an ine-
liminable precondition of all inquiry, including scientific inquiry—for every inquiry 
presupposes the disclosure of a meaningful world investigated by the inquirer. Pre-
scientific experience is not a chaotic flux of blooming, buzzing confusion that only 
becomes coherent under scientific scrutiny; rather, in everyday life, we dwell in an 
intelligible world that serves as base camp for our scientific voyaging.
Now, although both traditions turned towards meaning in response to philoso-
phy’s identity crisis, they did so differently. As Michael Dummett tells the story, 
early analytic philosophers focused on linguistic meaning, while Husserl’s phenom-
enology extended the notion of Sinn to all intentional acts, linguistic or otherwise.36 
For the phenomenologist, then, experience is meaningful all the way down: Every 
experience is an experience of something as something, and it’s this ubiquitous 
experiential meaning—the so-called ‘as-structure’ of experience—that CP clarifies. 
How does it do so?
Once again, a contrast with science proves instructive. Science seeks what John 
McDowell calls “enabling understanding,” i.e., it explains reality in causal terms, 
identifying the underlying causal enablers of observable phenomena and the laws 
that govern those enablers. Thus, science articulates what Wilfrid Sellars calls the 
“space of causes” and the “scientific image” of humanity. Phenomenology, on the 
other hand, is not an explanatory enterprise but a clarificatory one. Instead of ena-
bling understanding, it pursues constitutive understanding—an articulation of the 
36 Dummett (1993).
34 Many prominent contemporary phenomenologists endorse this basic conception of CP. Steven Crow-
ell, in particular, is associated with the view that what unites the seemingly heterogenous phenomeno-
logical tradition is the “‘reduction’ from our ordinary concern with entities, being, the ‘world,’ to the 
meaning at issue in such concern” (Crowell 2019, 229–230). For other work broadly on board with this 
view, see Carr (1999), Drummond (1990), McMullin (2013, 2019), Thomasson (2019), Wheeler (2005) 
and Zahavi (2017).
35 Crowell (2002) and Thomasson (2007).
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aspects of human subjectivity that allow us to constitute phenomena as the kind of 
phenomena they are. To be clear, we constitute phenomena not in the sense that 
we make them; rather, our subjectivity allows us to make sense of phenomena in a 
determinate way. The world we encounter always makes sense to us in some deter-
minate way: everything I experience spontaneously presents itself as meaningful, as 
this or that kind of phenomenon. And CP clarifies the constitutive features of sub-
jectivity through which phenomena are given to us as something determinate. Thus, 
CP is rightly considered a branch of transcendental philosophy, as it analyses the 
preconditions of sense. Unlike natural science, then, which makes first-order claims 
about objects in the space of causes, CP is a second-order, reflective enterprise that 
articulates the features of subjectivity that make it possible for us to occupy what 
Crowell, playing on Sellars’s language, aptly calls the “space of meaning.”37
Research in CP, it’s important to note, is correlational research. Phenomena 
always make sense – as this or that kind of phenomenon, in this or that mode of 
givenness—in relation to the features of our subjectivity. For example, the chair 
across from me presents a particular profile from a certain angle which makes an 
implicit reference to my perceptual capacities, bodily posture, and spatial position; 
at the same time, I intend the chair as having profiles not currently visible, which 
implicitly refers to my ability to explore the world with my body; what’s more, the 
fact that I spontaneously encounter the chair as a chair makes implicit reference to 
the cultural know-how I possess in virtue of belonging to a shared social world; and 
so on. CP studies the myriad layers of these correlations between features of our 
subjectivity and the determinate way phenomena make sense to us.
CP makes this correlation thematic via a reflective method that involves a shift in 
attention. In everyday life, for the most part, I simply consider what’s in front of me, 
focusing on the first-order characteristics of entities and others. To analyse my expe-
rience phenomenologically, however, I have to shift my attention, broadening my 
perspective to consider a wider framework of meaning—one that attends not only 
to the phenomena before me but also to aspects of my own subjectivity in virtue of 
which I experience these phenomena in this determinate way.
To illustrate this shift with an example, say I have an appointment with a stu-
dent. In an ordinary, everyday attitude, when I meet her, I will simply attend to her 
first-order characteristics. To analyse the experience phenomenologically, however, 
I must shift my attention, taking in not only her first-order characteristics but also 
the broader framework of meaning in virtue of which she shows up to me precisely 
as she does. That broader framework will include, for example, the practice of edu-
cation, a practice that, broadly construed, consists of a range of purposive activi-
ties organized around our interests in improving our epistemic practices and shar-
ing knowledge. And it is only in virtue of the position my student occupies in that 
practice that I can experience her as a student. But it’s not the mere fact that the 
practice of education exists that allows me to experience her as a student; it’s also 
my sensitivity to the normative expectations of the practice that makes that possible. 
In other words, to experience her as a student, I need to be sufficiently socialized 
37 Crowell (2001, p. 5).
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into the practice to be able to relate to her in terms of its normative expectations. 
What’s more, for me to experience her as a student, I also have to commit, in that 
very experience, to participating in the practice and seeing myself in its terms. I not 
only have to be sensitive to the normative expectations of the practice, then; I also 
have to commit to understanding my current experience in terms of those expecta-
tions. I have to relate to my student and the situation in terms of my commitments as 
a teacher.
Of course, the larger point here is that these claims hold not only of experiencing 
someone as a student; rather, it purports to identify constitutive features of subjec-
tivity that underwrite meaningful experience in general: We make sense of phenom-
ena as this or that kind of phenomenon in virtue of our sensitivity to the normative 
expectations of shared social practices and our real-time commitment to understand-
ing ourselves in terms of those normative expectations. I can’t defend these claims 
fully here, nor do I have space to identify the many other aspects of subjectivity at 
work in the constitution of meaningful experience. My goal, however, was only to 
illustrate how CP’s method works: In a phenomenological attitude, we widen our 
attention to reflect not just on phenomena but also on our own sense-making capaci-
ties that enable us to encounter them as the determinate phenomena they are.
My approach to AP stays safe from the ‘distinctiveness’ horn, then, by relying 
explicitly on CP. No empirical approach to experience provides this kind of analysis. 
As we’ve seen, however, relying on CP immediately puts me under pressure from 
the ‘Who cares?’ horn. Why should anyone outside a small circuit of philosophy 
conferences care about such considerations?
4.2  Something worth doing?
At the end of section three, we took a cue from Wheeler and suggested that the 
answer to this question lies in AP’s interdisciplinary character.38 And I proposed that 
we understand AP as a research program that (1) identifies an intrinsically interdisci-
plinary problem, (2) uses CP to characterize the constitutive features of subjectivity 
implicated by that problem, and (3) integrates (2) with the findings and/or methods 
of some other discipline(s) to solve the target problem. This keeps AP continuous 
with the phenomenological tradition, because it relies on CP’s distinctive method; 
but it also justifies AP’s status as an independent enterprise, because it relies on 
methods and research results unavailable to CP and tackles problems beyond CP’s 
purview. Implicit in this approach to AP are the following commitments:
(1) A commitment to doing problem-driven work: Every project in AP should tackle 
a problem that (a) lacks a monodisciplinary solution and (b) becomes more trac-
table once we bring the resources of CP and some other discipline(s) to bear on 
it.
38 This resonates with a tradition that understands applied philosophy in terms of its “essentially inter-
disciplinary nature” (Stevenson 1970, p. 263).
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(2) A commitment to minimizing technical jargon that might alienate researchers 
from other disciplines.
(3) A commitment to offering something valuable to practitioners of other dis-
ciplines and/or professionals and stakeholders potentially impacted by their 
research.
Adhering to these commitments, I contend, should make work in AP worth doing 
and thereby defuse the target dilemma by neutralizing the ‘Who cares?’ horn.
To illustrate how this approach works in practice and why it should be of interest 
to people outside a narrow group of philosophers, I’ll dedicate the rest of this sec-
tion to an example. For heuristic purposes, I’ll speak of AP as a three-step process:
Step 1: Identify a challenging interdisciplinary problem.
Step 2: Use CP to characterize the constitutive features of subjectivity implicated 
by that problem.
Step 3: Integrate step 2′s results with the findings of some other discipline(s).
To begin with the first “step,”take as our interdisciplinary problem the develop-
ment of a comprehensive approach to decision making under risk. I have no inten-
tion of solving that problem here, of course; I only want to sketch how AP might 
contribute towards such a solution.
Today’s dominant approaches to this problem argue that risk is an intrinsically 
probabilistic affair and so the only normatively correct standards for rational risk 
decisions rely strictly on some version of probability theory.39 Probability theories 
divide into two main camps: subjective and objective.40 Both conceptualize risk 
mathematically, adhere to the basic consistency rules of probability calculus, and 
represent every risk event as bearing a definite value from 0 to 1. For both camps, 
then, the risk of  R1 is greater than the risk of  R2 just in case  R1 is more probable 
than  R2. The camps divide, however, over the question of what risk is. Subjective 
approaches conceive of risk as the measure of an agent’s coherent degree of belief 
(or ‘credence’) that a risk event will occur. Objective approaches, on the other hand, 
conceive of risks as independent of what anyone believes. The dominant objective 
approach is the relative frequency (or frequentist) interpretation, according to which 
risk is the rate of occurrence of some risk event in a given reference class.
Neither probabilistic approach, however, can serve as a comprehensive guide 
to risk decisions, because neither affords sufficient guidance for singular risk 
decisions, i.e., one-off decisions that aim to manage the risks associated with 
a single decision made by (or on behalf of) one person in a specific set of cir-
cumstances at a particular time. As John Oberdiek has recently argued, neither 
subjective nor objective approaches provide well-intentioned agents sufficient 
guidance for making such decisions.41 Subjective approaches offer practical but 
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insufficiently normative guidance: Their guidance is practical because the agent 
only needs to consult her own beliefs to arrive at a determinate assessment of the 
relevant probabilities; but their guidance is insufficiently normative for the same 
reason. If two people have different priors about event E, the subjective approach 
offers no normative basis to adjudicate their disagreement. It promises that their 
assessments will converge ‘in the long run’, but that won’t help us make a singular 
risk decision now. The objective approach, on the other hand, provides guidance 
that is normative but impractical. Its guidance is normative, because it is objec-
tive; but it is impractical for at least two reasons. First, there is the “single case 
problem”: Since frequentism defines risk as the relative frequency of some risk 
event E in reference class C, it cannot provide guidance for decisions that involve 
unique risk events, because in a reference class with 1 member, the only possible 
values for E are 0 or 1. What’s more, every event is arguably unique. Secondly, 
there is “the reference class problem”: For any risk event E, we can assign E to 
any number of reference classes in which the relative frequency of E differs; thus, 
frequentist risks are objective but indeterminate. Probabilistic approaches cannot 
offer a comprehensive approach to decision making under risk, then, because they 
cannot guide our singular risk decisions.
Here we begin “Step 2” of our AP analysis. Which constitutive features of sub-
jectivity are implicated by our target problem? Put otherwise, what are the aspects 
of subjectivity in virtue of which we experience something as a risk? According to 
some proponents of today’s dominant risk theories, this is not a helpful question, 
because the term ‘risk’ just means ‘probability’. This claim, however, obscures the 
phenomenological constitution of risk. To see why, imagine the following scenarios:
Scenario1:  There’s a 0.75 probability that in ten minutes a nuclear explosion will 
occur in a vacuum in some distant region of space, affecting no living organisms, 
now or ever.
Scenario2:  There’s a 0.75 probability that in ten minutes an explosion of the same 
magnitude will occur in a densely populated city.
Although the relevant probabilities are identical, it would be obtuse to claim that 
these scenarios pose the same risk; indeed, it’s unclear that  scenario1 poses any risk. 
Why? Because to experience some future event E as a risk, I have to experience E 
as a posing a significant chance of a setback to someone’s interests. Phenomena that 
do not threaten anyone’s interests do not show up as risks. What’s more, as agents, 
our interests are those things that matter to us and in which we have a stake, and so 
there is an essential correlation between our interests and what we care about. Our 
cares shape our interests, and our interests reflect our cares. Given this risk-interest-
care connection, then, we can say that it is only in virtue of our cares that we can 
experience phenomena as risks. An event can only show up as a risk for someone in 
light of what she cares about. Our cares, then, are among the constitutive features of 
subjectivity implicated by the problem of singular risk decisions.
Turning now to “Step 3,” I want to propose that AP provides a promising way 
to think about a comprehensive approach to decision making under risk. Such 
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a framework would acknowledge the value of probabilistic approaches for man-
aging all sorts of risk decisions at the population and policy level. However, it 
would draw on phenomenological resources to tackle the practical and normative 
difficulties associated with singular risk decisions. Since one cannot merely rely 
on one’s subjective ‘credence’ about the probability of some outcome, nor can 
one simply refer to risk frequencies to make a call, one must instead engage in a 
fine-grained analysis of what this particular individual cares about and what is 
in this particular individual’s interests. At the end of the day, then, the decision 
will not only involve considerations of likelihood but also fundamentally norma-
tive questions about what matters to this person and what is in her best inter-
ests (considered in light of what she cares about); and a CP analysis of our cares 
and interests could help us better understand how such decisions are—and should 
be—made.
Of course, I’ve only just sketched the approach here, but it should suffice to 
illustrate how work in AP could evade the ‘Who cares?’ horn and thereby defuse 
the dilemma. Specifically, it shows how work in AP could (1) identify a challeng-
ing interdisciplinary problem, namely, developing a comprehensive approach to 
decision making under risk; (2) use CP to characterize the constitutive features of 
subjectivity implicated by that problem, i.e., our cares and interests as agents; and 
(3) integrate (2) with probabilistic theories of risk to build a more comprehensive 
approach to the problem identified in (1). Such an approach could make a valuable 
contribution not only to AP but also to practitioners of other disciplines and the pro-
fessionals and stakeholders who make risk decisions on a daily basis.
5  Conclusion
This article reconstructed prominent criticisms of AP as a dilemma: Either AP 
merely offers first-person descriptions of experience, or it involves the constitutive 
analysis characteristic of CP; in either case, we’re better off studying the experien-
tial dimension by other means. I then argued that many prominent contemporary 
conceptions of AP get impaled by this dilemma, and I offered a new conception 
of AP as a research program that integrates CP with the method and/or findings of 
some other discipline(s) to solve problems for which no monodisciplinary solution 
suffices. My approach to AP defuses the target dilemma: It stays safe from the ‘dis-
tinctiveness’ horn, because it relies on CP; and it survives the ‘Who cares?’ horn, 
because it solves interdisciplinary problems of interest to academics, professionals, 
and stakeholders across a variety of theoretical and practical contexts.
At the outset of this paper, I said that the clarificatory work undertaken here 
matters because AP owes its critics answers. By defusing the dilemma, we have 
answered their most damning criticisms. This work also matters, however, because 
right now there’s a lot of excellent research being done in AP, but we lack any con-
sensus about the shared aims and methodological commitments of such work. It’s 
important to clearly explain what we do when we do AP, then, not only to answer 
AP’s critics but also to establish a shared research program around which practi-
tioners can gather to do their vital work. Today we face many interdisciplinary 
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challenges to which AP could make key contributions; but to do so well, AP’s prac-
titioners need to operate with a clear sense of precisely what kind of contribution 
they stand to make. I hope we continue this conversation and make applied phenom-
enology what it needs to be: an interdisciplinary research program that puts core 
phenomenological analyses of the constitutive features of subjectivity into conversa-
tion with other disciplines to solve real-world problems.
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